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Abstract
In the recent landmark decision of Washington v. Glucksberg,’ the
United States Supreme Court upheld a Washington statute criminalizing
assisted suicide for terminally ill patients.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent landmark decision of Washington v. Glucksberg,' the
United States Supreme Court upheld a Washington statute criminalizing
2
assisted suicide for terminally ill patients. The Supreme Court declined to
find a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and further found that the prohibition on assisted
suicide survived a rational basis test.3 In examining the Supreme Court's
decision, Part II of this case comment sets forth the factual and procedural
history of the case. The parties' arguments and an analysis of the Supreme
Court decision are explored in Part III of this comment. Part IV discusses a
recent Supreme Court of Florida case. Part V suggests that there are several
conflicts with this recent decision which require resolution. Finally, the
conclusion suggests possible recommendations to the legislature.
II. HISTORY OF WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG
A. Facts of the Case
1. Defendant State of Washington
Despite the fact that the State of Washington does not have any law
prohibiting suicide, the legislature enacted a statute which prohibits aiding or
causing the suicide of another person and provides that a violation of the
statute will result in im4 risonment for a maximum of five years and a fine
not to exceed $10,000. Furthermore, existing law in Washington, such as
the Natural Death Act, immunizes a physician from liability for carrying out
a directive from a competent, terminally ill patient to withdraw hydration and
nutrition.5 In the case at hand, the plaintiffs consisted of three patients, five
1. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) [hereinafter Glucksberg].
2. Id. at 2261.
3. Id. at 2261-62.
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(1)(c) (1994). See section 9A.36.060 of the
Washington Revised Code on assisted suicide, which provides that: "(1) [a] person is guilty of
promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt
suicide[, and] (2) [plromoting a suicide attempt is a class C felony." Id. § 9A.36.060. In
1854, the State of Washington prohibited "'assisting another in the commission of self-
murder."' Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261 n.1 (citation omitted).
5. Brief for Respondent at 1, Glucksberg (No. 96-110); see also WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.122.010 (1994) (providing that "adult persons have the fundamental right to control the
decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, including the decision to have
life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition").
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physicians, and a nonprofit organization that assists and counsels terminally
ill patients and family members.6
2. Plaintiff Patients
After enduring procedures such as chemotherapy, radiation, and
surgery, Dr. Jane Roe, a retired pediatrician, was losing her life to breast
cancer at the age of sixty-nine.7 During this time, Dr. Roe experienced
extreme pain and suffering, which she tried unsuccessfully to relieve with
massive doses of morphine.8 After several counseling sessions, and with the
knowledge that there was no chance for recovery, Dr. Roe decided that she
wanted to use medication prescribed by her physician for the purpose of
hastening her impending death.9
John Doe, a forty-four-year-old painter who was diagnosed with
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") in 1991, was losing his
battle and was advised by his doctors that he was in the terminal stage of his
sickness.10 Mr. Doe had sustained pneumonia, excessive fatigue, seizures,
skin and sinus infections, seventy-percent blindness, and a decreased ability
to care for himself.11 However, he was mentally competent and aware of the
pain he would have to endure since he had cared for his companion who had
died from AIDS.12 Mr. Doe, understanding that the virus was incurable,
wished to take drugs prescribed by his doctor to hasten his death. 3
James Poe, a sixty-nine-year-old retired sales representative who was in
the terminal phase of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, experienced
constant suffocation, which required a permanent connection to an oxygen
6. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1456 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
aff'd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. 2258 (1997) [hereinafter Compassion]. The following parties were the plaintiffs: Jane
Roe, John Doe, James Poe, Dr. Harold Glucksberg, Dr. John Geyman, Dr. Thomas Preston,
Dr. Abigail Halperin, Dr. Peter Shalit, and Compassion in Dying. Id. at 1456-58.
7. Id. at 1456.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1456.
11. Id.; see also Brief for Respondent at 3, Glucksberg (No. 96-110) (explaining that
Mr. Doe was susceptible "to all manner of infection" and was expected to experience total
blindness).
12. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1456; see also Brief for Respondent at 3, Glucksberg
(No. 96-110) (illustrating that Mr. Doe had observed the "pain, suffering, and loss of bodily
function, integrity, and personal dignity" typically caused by Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome ("AIDS")).
13. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1456-57.
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tank. 14 He endured extreme leg pain, painful swelling, and immobility due to
a lack of blood flow, which resulted in the administering of morphine on a
regular basis.15  Because the suffering was intolerable and the illness
incurable, Mr. Poe, a mentally competent patient, wished to accelerate his
impending death with the assistance of his physician.16 Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision, all three of the plaintiffs died from their terminal
illnesses.17
3. Plaintiff Physicians
Dr. Harold Glucksberg practices oncology at the Pacific Medical Center
in Seattle and is an assistant professor at the University of Washington
School of Medicine.1 8 He has published several articles in various medical
journals concerning cancer.19 In his declaration to the United States District
Court for the Ninth Circuit, Dr. Glucksberg stated that cancer patients
experience "excruciating, unrelenting pain" and that the massive dosage of
medication, which is administered to alleviate pain, impairs
consciousness.20 Dr. Glucksberg declined the request, in accordance with the
criminal statute, to prescribe lethal medication for one of his terminally ill,
though competent, suffering patients who wished to self-administer the drugs
to hasten his death. 21  After this refusal, the patient, wishing to commit
suicide by jumping from a bridge, recruited a family member to help him do
SO.22
Dr. John Geyman, a professor emeritus at the University of Washington
and a practitioner of family medicine, has written numerous articles and
14. Id. at 1457; see also Brief for Respondent at 3, Glucksberg (No. 96-110) (describing
that Mr. Poe was fearful due to his "'constant sensation of suffocation' and that he had
trouble sleeping for more than two or three hours).
15. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1457; see also Brief for Respondent at 3, Glucksberg
(No. 96-110) (describing that Mr. Poe took these medications to "calm his 'terror"').
16. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1457.
17. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en
banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) [hereinafter Compassion in Dying].
18. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1457.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citation omitted).
21. Brief for Respondent at 5, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
22. Id.
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books in the field of family medicine.23 He has declared that his patients
experience unnecessary extended deaths filled with suffering and
humiliation, and that they attempt unsuccessful suicides, which often worsen
their mental and physical conditions.24
In addition, the following doctors were plaintiff physicians in the matter
of Washington v. Glucksberg: Dr. Thomas Preston, Dr. Abigail Halperin,
and Dr. Peter Shalit. Dr. Thomas Preston is the chief of cardiology at Pacific
Medical Center and has written numerous articles and books in the field of
cardiology?2 On a regular basis, Dr. Preston treats patients who are in the
terminal phase of cardiopulmonary diseases.26  Dr. Abigail Halperin
occasionally treats AIDS and cancer patients.27 On one occasion, a mentally
competent breast cancer patient requested that Dr. Halperin _provide
assistance in hastening her death so that she could die with dignity.' After
the rejection of this request, the patient used a plastic bag to suffocate
herself.2 9 Dr. Peter Shalit, who practices internal medicine, was forced to
decline a similar request for lethal medication. 30 This patient was suffering
from pain as a result of "[o]ozing lesions," causing immobility and inability
to urinate and was further forced to endure gangrenous fingers.31 As a result
of these horrific sights, family members refused to visit because they could
not tolerate observing their loved one's "physical torture."
32
4. Plaintiff Compassion in Dying
Compassion in Dying is a nonprofit organization located in Washington,
which provides information, counseling, and emotional support for
terminally ill patients and their families, but does not provide lethal
medication.3 3  The organization has stringent requirements for eligibility
which include the following: 1) a determination by the patient's physician
that the patient is terminally ill; 2) a mental health evaluation indicating that
23. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1457. A professor emeritus is one who is "retired or
honorably discharged from active duty because of age, infirmity, or long service, but retained
on the rolls." TIE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 432 (rev. ed. 1984).
24. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1457.
25. Id. at 1458.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Brief for Respondent at 5, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1458; see also Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 588.
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the patient is not suffering from mental abnormalities; 3) a finding that the
demand for assisted suicide does not result from inadequate medical care or
economic concerns; 4) a finding that the request must originate from the
patient either in writing or by videotape; and 5) a finding that the request has
been repeated three times with at least forty-eight hours between the second
and third requests.34 The organization has implemented other safeguards,
which include the denial of services for uncertainty, family member
disapproval, and a showing that the patient is not terminally ill, or has
inadequate pain management.35 Compassion in Dying, although a plaintiff in
the federal district court and appellee in the appellate court, was not a party
in the Supreme Court case.
B. Procedural History
The issue in this case was whether the State of Washington's statute
36prohibiting physician-assisted suicide was constitutional. The plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and
an injunction preventing enforcement of the statute.37 In Compassion in38
Dying v. Washington, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington held that the statute was unconstitutional. 39 The State
thereafter appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the lower court.4° When the Ninth Circuit reversed on rehearing en banc, the
plaintiff physicians petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and
the Supreme Court, in Washington v. Glucksberg, reversed, holding the
statute to be constitutional.4 ' In the plaintiffs' initial brief to the Supreme
Court, the following challenges were made: 1) Whether "The Clear Line
Between Permitting Refusal Of Treatment And Prohibiting Action Intended
34. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1458.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1455-56. The issue is whether "Washington's prohibition against 'caus[ing]'
or 'aid[ing]' a suicide offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261.
37. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1456.
38. Id. at 1454.
39. Id. at 1467. Compassion in Dying v. Washington was brought in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington. The decision was appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying v.
Washington. The Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc. Finally, the case was appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.
40. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 588.
41. 117 S. Ct. at 2258.
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To Cause Death Is Based On Well-Settled Legal Doctrines"4 2; 2) "Whether
That Line Should Be Disturbed To Allow Physician-Assisted Suicide Is A
Complex And Controversial Issue Of Public Policy Which Is Vigorously
Debated Throughout The Landa 3; 3) Whether "State Legislatures Should Be
Allowed To Resolve The Issue Without Having Their Policy Choices
Limited"44; 4) Whether "The Decision Below [Was] A Radical Departure
From Our Nation's Legal Traditions" a5 and "[The] Court's Fourteenth
Amendment Jurisprudence."
' '
C. Analysis of the Western District of Washington Decision
1. Due Process/Liberty Interests
The Western District of Washington examined liberty interests under
Planned Parenthood v. Casey47 and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health.48 In Casey, the Supreme Court explained that a
terminally ill person's decision to terminate his or her life "'involv[es] the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime' and
constitutes a 'choice[] central to personal dignity and autonomy. ''49  In
Compassion, the federal district court held the suffering of a terminally ill
patient to be as important and worthy of protection from governmental
intrusion as that of a pregnant woman.50 The federal district court
distinguished Casey by determining that the life interests of the pregnant
woman and the potential life "which cannot speak for itself' are at risk
concerning an abortion, whereas there is only one life at stake, which can
"voice his or her wishes," in the present case.51 Therefore, according to the
42. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 16.
46. Id.
47. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (upholding a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy
pre-viability without undue influence from the government, establishing the state's authority
to restrict abortions post-viability, and acknowledging the state's interest in protecting both the
health of the fetus and woman).
48. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (recognizing
that a mentally competent, terminally ill adult has the right to refuse unwanted life-sustaining
medical treatment).
49. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1460 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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federal district court, because it was decided that there is a liberty interest
with respect to a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, a dilemma which
brings about more complex issues concerning governmental competing
interests than does physician-assisted suicide, there should be a fundamental
liberty interest in assisted suicide.5 2
The federal district court next focused on Cruzan, where the- Supreme
Court assumed that a mentally competent individual has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in declining "'the artificial delivery of food and
water.' ''53 The federal district court reasoned that liberty interests which
warrant protection by the Fourteenth Amendment concern matters "which are
essential to personal autonomy and basic human dignity" and that "[tihere is
no more profoundly personal decision, nor one which is closer to the heart of
personal liberty, than the choice which a terminally ill person makes to end
his or her suffering and hasten an inevitable death. 54 The federal district
court noted Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Cruzan which
explained that requiring a mentally competent adult to sustain unwanted
procedures burdens his or her "'liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine the
course of her own treatment"' and that the liberty protected under the Due
Process Clause must at least guarantee a patient's right to reject medical
treatment.55  The federal district court could not find a differentiation
between the refusal of life-saving treatment and the request for assisted
suicide by a voluntary, mentally competent adult.5 6
2. Undue Burden Test
The Western District of Washington used the standard set forth in
Casey, in which the court must determine whether the questionable statute
would operate as "a substantial obstacle" for an individual who is seeking to
commit physician-assisted suicide. 7 The federal district court reasoned that
the Washington statute "not only places a substantial obstacle in the path of a
terminally ill, mentally competent person wishing to commit physician-
assisted suicide, but entirely prohibits it," thus placing an undue burden on
the individual's constitutionally protected liberty interest.58 The federal
district court responded to the State's argument, that there are legitimate state
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1461 n.4 (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
54. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1461.
55. Id. at 1461 n.4 (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 1461.
57. Id. at 1465 (citation omitted).
58. Id.
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interests in preventing suicide and protecting vulnerable individuals at risk
for suicide from undue influence, by holding that the legislature can
formulate safeguards and define the limitations of physician-assisted
suicide.59  These regulations would provide a mechanism which would
guarantee that individuals are not acting according to "abuse, coercion or
undue influence from third parties." 60 The federal district court pointed out
that the Supreme Court of Washington and Washington law have not only
acknowledged the right of a mentally competent, terminally ill patient to
withhold life-sustaining treatment, but have further recognized the authority
of a surrogate or representative to withhold treatment, acting on behalf of the
patient's interests. The federal district court reasoned that the potential
abuse for disconnection from a life support system might be even greater
than that suspected of physician-assisted suicide when the patient is
competent and a surrogate is acting on his or her behalf.62
3. Equal Protection
In the federal district court, the plaintiffs argued that the Washington
statute denied two similarly situated groups of terminally ill adults equal
protection of the law as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.63  The defendants argued that there is no
distinction because death resulting from the withdrawal of life-sustaining
systems is natural, whereas death resulting from other means is
artificial.64 The federal district court found, according to Washington case
law and the Washington Natural Death Act, that the state has taken the first
step in acknowledging that "its interest in preventing suicide does not require
an absolute ban." 5 The federal district court was not convinced that the
distinction between "natural" and "artificial" death justified "disparate
59. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1465.
60. Id. at 1465 n.10.
61. Id. at 1466 n.11 (citing In Re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 446 (Wash.
1987), amended by 757 P.2d 534 (Wash. 1988) (holding that the legal guardian of an
incompetent patient suffering from Batten's disease had the right to terminate life supporting
medical procedures)); see also In Re Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Wash.
1984) (holding that an incompetent, terminally ill patient may be withdrawn from life support
by an immediate family member or an appointed guardian ad litem); Natural Death Act,
WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.010 (1994) (describing the legal prerequisites a person must fulfill
for carrying out a written request for refusal of life-supporting procedures).
62. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1465.
63. Id. at 1459.
64. Id. at 1467.
65. Id.
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treatment" among the two groups in that both individuals are terminally ill,
both individuals are enduring pain and humiliation, and both individuals
would be exposed to a prolonged death process without medical
interference.66  The federal district court concluded that the Washington
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
allowing the withdrawal of life-support systems, but prohibiting physician-
assisted suicide for mentally competent, terminally ill adults. 67 The federal
district court subsequently entered final judgment declaring the Washington
statute unconstitutional and the court declined to grant injunctive relief.68
D. Analysis of the Ninth Circuit
1. Majority Opinion
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the federal district court's
decision and held the Washington statute, which prohibits assisted-suicide, to
be constitutional. 69 First, the Ninth Circuit explained that the federal district
court relied on language from the Casey opinion and applied this out of the
context for which these principles were originally intended within the
meaning of abortion. 70 The court reasoned that "[i]t is commonly accounted
an error to lift sentences or even paragraphs out of one context and insert the
abstracted thought into a wholly different context. 71  Second, Cruzan did
involve the cessation of life; however, the Ninth Circuit noted that the federal
district court improperly declined to differentiate between those individuals
withdrawing life support and those seeking medical assistance to assist in
self-killing.' 2 Third, the Ninth Circuit accused the federal district court of
"invent[ing] a constitutional right unknown to the past and antithetical to the
defense of human life. 73 Fourth, with respect to the federal district court's
undue burden analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that the quotation from Casey
regarding the abortion issue was again extended to a field where it has no
66. Id.
67. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
68. Id. at 1467-68.
69. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 588.
70. Id. at 590.
71. Id.
72. Id. at591.
73. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that the lower court's decision was groundless in the
history and traditions of the United States. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591. According
to the Ninth Circuit: "In the two hundred and five years of our existence no constitutional
right to aid in killing oneself has ever been asserted and upheld by a court of final
jurisdiction." Id.
[Vol. 22:821
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss3/10
1998]
application and that the conclusion that the statute was facially invalid was
unfounded.74
Next, the Ninth Circuit focused its examination on the interests of the
State of Washington and concluded that these interests outbalanced any
asserted liberty interest.75 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that preserving the
integrity of the medical profession and preventing physicians from
participating in the suicide of their patients was an important state interest,
which if ignored, could result in impeding the physician's continual quest for
cures.76 The Ninth Circuit claimed that patients will be unduly influenced by
their physicians because of "pressure to consent to their own deaths., 77 The
Ninth Circuit further alleged that the poor, handicapped, and underprivileged
will suffer exploitation and abuse if there are laws permitting physician-
assisted suicide.
78
Finally, the Ninth Circuit explained that there exists disagreement
among the states as to the definition of "terminally ill" and that the federal
district court, in not certifying a class, failed to identify the persons for which
judgment was entered.79 The Ninth Circuit stated that the plaintiffs did not
meet the burden of proving "'that the legislature's actions were irrational"' in
enacting the statute and that there was no foundation in criminal or tort law
that supported the federal district court's decision. 0 The Ninth Circuit
further explained that a license does not grant a physician the right to expose
a patient to unwanted medical procedures and that an individual has "'the
right to be let alone"' if he or she desires.8 1 According to the Ninth Circuit,
the distinction between the patient who directs that lifesaving treatment be
terminated and a patient who seeks assisted suicide is rooted in the common
law and tradition of the United States; more specifically, there has not existed
an acknowledged right to have another "enslave you, mutilate you, or kill
you., 82 The court characterized assisted suicide as having the right to seek
out another individual to cooperate in one's self-killing as opposed to seeking
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 592.
77. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 593. The district court had entered judgment for Jane Roe and John Doe even
though they had already died. The judgment of James Poe lapsed upon his death; thus, the
judgment was entered on behalf of the respondents' future terminally ill patients. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Kadramus v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450,463 (1988)).
81. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
82. Id.
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the termination of unwanted medical treatment.8 3 The Ninth Circuit did not
decide the question of whether the Washington statute violated equal
84protection.
2. Dissenting Opinion
In the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Eugene Wright dissented,
finding that the Washington statute violated the "plaintiffs' privacy and equal
protection rights. 85 Judge Wright explained that the federal district court's
application of Casey was entirely appropriate and not limited only to abortion
cases, but originates from Supreme Court precedent and involves matters
concerning intimate decisions which deal with "'marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.' ' 86 Judge
Wright further agreed with the federal district court that there cannot be a
distinction between refusing unwanted treatment and seeking physician-
assisted suicide. 7
3. En Banc Opinion
A limited en banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the three-
judge panel's decision and affirmed the federal district court.88 The court
focused on Casey and Cruzan, holding that there is a constitutionally
recognized right to die.89 Upon a petition, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 9° In Compassion in Dying II, Judge Beezer dissented,
finding that mentally competent, terminally ill individuals do not have a
83. Id.
84. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2262 (citing Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d
790, 838 (9th Cir. 1996)) [hereinafter Compassion in Dying II].
85. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594 (Wright, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 595 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). Judge
Wright explained that an individual's right to privacy consists of "'the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."' Id. (quoting Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589,599-600 (1977)).
87. Id. Judge Wright commented that "[s]uch a distinction yields patently unjust
results." Id. at 596. According to the majority view, if an individual is dependent on a
respirator and the suffering is intolerable, that person may direct the physicians to withdraw
life-support. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 596. However, a similarly situated patient who
does not depend on life-sustaining medical treatment, does not have that same right. Id.
88. Compassion in Dying II, 79 F.3d at 839.
89. Id. at 799-801.
90. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2262.
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fundamental liberty interest, and that the state's interests "are sufficiently
strong to sustain the constitutionality"9' of the statute.
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. Plaintiffs' Argument before the Supreme Court
The plaintiffs urged that the Ninth Circuit ignored the Supreme Court's
analytical approach to substantive due process claims and invented a liberty
interest which has no foundation in our nation's tradition, characterizing it as
a "radical departure." 92 The plaintiffs further argued that there is a distinct
difference between allowing the withdrawal of medical treatment and
disallowing conduct which brings about death, and that this distinction is
rooted in "well-settled legal doctrines." 93 This argument is based on the fact
that, at common law and in most states today, treatment without informed
consent is considered a battery, whereas an individual who causes another's
death would be criminally liable.94 Additionally, there are existing statutes in
the majority of states which criminalize assisted suicide.95 The plaintiffs
argued that Cruzan stands for the proposition that one has a constitutionally
recognized right to refuse unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment, which
allows the illness to "follow a natural course to death. 96
B. Defendants' Argument before the Supreme Court
The defendants argued that the Supreme Court has, on prior occasions,
acknowledged that an individual has a liberty interest in making personal
decisions regarding the manner of one's death. 97 They claimed that the
individual has a right to decide this matter according to his or her beliefs and
values and that he or she should have the option of declining to endure
suffering and loss of dignity.98 The defendants argued that there is
discrimination between mentally competent, terminally ill patients requiring
life-sustaining medical treatment and those patients who do not necessitate
91. Compassion in Dying 11, 79 F.3d at 857 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
92. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 11.
95. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,280 (1990)).
96. Id. at 12.
97. Brief for Respondent at 7, Glucksberg (96-110).
98. Id. In permitting this right, the State argued that safeguards may be enacted to
prevent abuse and undue influence. Id.
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it.99 They alleged that there is a violation of equal protection because those
individuals who are dependent upon constant medical procedures to sustain
life are presented with the option of directing a physician to withdraw or
withhold this support, whereas those terminally ill patients who do not
require such care may not exercise the same option.'00
C. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on January 8,
1997.0' William L. Williams presented on behalf of the defendants, Walter
Dellinger as amicus curiae on behalf of the United States supporting
Defendants, and Kathryn Tucker on behalf of the plaintiffs.02 For the
Supreme Court's review, amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of several
organizations.'0 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion, holding that the
99. Id. at 8.
100. Id.
101. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2258.
102. Id. at 2261.
103. The following briefs are the amicus briefs which were filed: Brief for Physicians
for Compassionate Care, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 647921; Brief for Members of
the New York and Washington State Legislatures, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
648005; Brief for the United States Catholic Conference, New York Catholic Conference,
Washington State Catholic Conference, Oregon Catholic Conference, California Catholic
Conference, Michigan Catholic Conference, Christian Life Commission of the Southern
Baptist Convention, National Association of Evangelicals, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod,
Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod-Lutherans for Life, Evangelical Covenant Church, and
American Muslim Council, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 650919; Brief for Gary Lee,
M.D., William Petty, M.D., Fritz Beck, June Beck, Willows Residential Care Facility, Sister
Geraldine Bernards, Maryville Nursing Home, Inc., Janice Eisner, Claudine Stotler, Jeffrey M.
Weinkauf, and Physicians for Compassionate Care, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
647921; Brief for the States of California, Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
York, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia, and the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 650921; Brief for the Schiller Institute,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656260; Brief for the American Medical Association,
American Nurses Association, and American Psychiatric Association, Glucksberg (No. 96-
110), 1996 WL 656263; Brief for Family Research Council, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996
WL 656275; Brief for Choice in Dying, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656277; Brief for
the American Hospital Association, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656278; Brief for
American Geriatrics Society, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656290; Brief for Richard
Thompson Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
656291; Brief for the National Association of Prolife Nurses, National Association of
Directors of Nursing Administration in Long Term Care, Philippine Nurses Association of
America, Scholl Institute of Bioethics, California Nurses for Ethical Standards, Glucksberg
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(No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656299; Brief for the Southern Center for Law and Ethics,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656302; Brief for the Legal Center for Defense of Life,
Inc. and the Prolife Legal Defense Fund, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656314; Brief
for the National Right to Life Committee, Inc., Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656315;
Brief for the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
656322; Brief for the American Association of Homes and Services for the Aging, et al.,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656324; Brief for the Institute for Public Affairs of the
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (UOJCA) and the Rabbinical Council of
America, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656330; Brief for the National Legal Center for
the Medically Dependent & Disabled, Inc., the Disabilities Perspectives, Ethics and Advocacy
Task Force of the Nursing Home Action Group, and Michigan Handicapper Cau.,-js,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656336; Brief for the Christian Legal Society, Christian
Medical and Dental Society, Christians Pharmacists Fellowship International, Nurses
Christian Fellowship, and Fellowship of Christian Physician Assistants, Glucksberg (No. 96-
110), 1996 WL 656337; Brief for the National Hospice Organization, Glucksberg (No. 96-
110), 1996 WL 656338; Brief for the Catholic Medical Association, Glucksberg (No. 96-110),
1996 WL 656339; Brief for the American Center for Law & Justice, Glucksberg (No. 96-110),
1996 WL 656340; Brief for the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Glucksberg (No.
96-110), 1996 WL 656341; Brief of the National Catholic Office for Persons with Disabilities
and Knights of Columbus, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656342; Brief of the Catholic
Health Association of the United States, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656343; Brief for
Bioethics Professors, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 657754; Brief of Senator Orrin
Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Representative Henry Hyde, Chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee, and Representative Charles Canady, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee, Glucksberg (No. 96-
110), 1996 WL 657755; Brief of the District Attorney of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 657807; Brief of the Project on Death in America, Open
Society Institute, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 658736; Brief for the United States,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 663185; Brief of the State of Oregon, Glucksberg (No.
96-110), 1996 WL 663194; Brief for the National Spinal Cord Injury Association, Inc.,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 664997; Brief of the American Suicide Foundation,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 665436; Brief of the American College of Legal
Medicine, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 668827; Brief of the Center for Reproductive
Law & Policy, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708943; Brief for Council for Secular
Humanism and International Academy of Humanism, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
708950; Brief for Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas
Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708956; Brief of the
Washington State Psychological Association, the American Counseling Association, the
Association for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Issues in Counseling, and a Coalition of Mental
Health Professionals, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708960; Brief of the American
Medical Student Association and a Coalition of Distinguished Medical Professionals,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709332; Brief of Americans for Death with Dignity and
the Death with Dignity Education Center, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709335; Brief
of Bioethicists, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709337; Brief of State Legislation,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709339; Brief for the National Women's Health Network
and Northwest Women's Law Center, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709341; Brief of
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Washington statute, which prohibits the act of causing or aiding a suicide,
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the United StatesConstitution. 1°4
The opinion begins by examining a history of suicide law in the State of
Washington, including section 9A.36.060 of the Revised Code of
Washington, enacted in 1975, and Washington's Natural Death Act, enacted
in 1979.105 After Washington voters had declined an initiative which would
have allowed a form of physician-assisted suicide, the legislature amended
the Natural Death Act to specifically exclude it.1°6 The Court, in Part I of the
opinion, explored the historical and legal doctrines of the United States,
noting that in forty-four states, the District of Columbia, and the two
territories, it is a crime to assist in suicide.' °7 The Court commented that
these laws reflect the commitment of the states in preserving and protecting
life and that the Anglo-American common law for over 700 years has either
the Coalition of Hospice Professionals, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709342; Brief of
36 Religious Organizations, Leaders and Scholars, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
711178; Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of
Washington, National Gray Panthers Project Fund, Gray Panthers of Washington, Gray
Panthers of New York, Japanese American Citizens League, Pacific Northwestern District of
the Japanese American Citizens League, Humanists of Washington State, Hemlock Society
USA, Hemlock Society of New York State, Hemlock Society of Washington State, Euthanasia
Research Guidance Organization, AIDS Action Council, Northwest AIDS Foundation, Seattle
AIDS Support Group, Local 6 of the Service Employees International Union, Temple De
Hirsch Sinai Social Action Committee, Seattle/King County Chapter of the Older Women's
League, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 711194; Brief of Julian Whitaker, M.D.,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 711203; Brief for the Gay Men's Health Crisis and
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 711205;
Brief of Wayne County, Michigan, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 722030; Brief of
Surviving Family Members in Support of Physician-Assisted Dying, Glucksberg (No. 96-
110), 1996 WL 722032; Brief for John Doe, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 743345;
Brief of the Rutherford Institute, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 752715.
104. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2266. Initiative 119 provided for an amendment to Washington's Natural
Death Act and allowed for "aid in dying." Id. at 2266 n.13. "Aid in dying" is:
[A]id in the form of a medical service provided in person by a physician that
will end the life of a conscious and mentally competent qualified patient in a
dignified, painless and humane manner, when requested voluntarily by the
patient through a written directive in accordance with this chapter at the time
the medical service is to be provided.
Id. (citation omitted).
107. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2263 n.8 (quoting Compassion in Dying II, 79 F.3d at
847).
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penalized or objected to suicide and assisted-suicide.0 8 In fact, the Court
points out that the first state to prohibit assistance in suicide was New York
in 1828, which was followed by many other states enacting similar
laws.1 9 The Court noted that each state has submitted numerous proposals to
permit physician-assisted suicide, but they are continually rejected by the
state legislatures1 10 As evidenced by the New York State's Task Force,
some states are actively involved in studies regarding physician-assisted
suicide."' In conclusion, the Supreme Court was unconvinced that it should
depart from centuries of well settled legal tradition. The Court then focused
its attention toward the due process claim.'
12
The Court explained that not only does the Due Process Clause
"'protect[] individual liberty against 'certain government actions regardless
of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them,"" but it also
affords protection against intervention with fundamental liberty interests. 1
These interests have been defined through an extensive series of United
States Supreme Court cases and include the right to marry,114 the right to
procreate, 15 the right to bodily integrity, 1 6 the right to control the education
and upbringing of one's children,117 the right of privacy during one's
marriage,"' the right to use contraception,' 9 and the right to terminate one's
108. Id. at 2263 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294-95
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
109. Id. at 2265 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 2266 n.15. The following states have submitted proposals: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
111. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267. The New York State's Task Force on Life and the
Law is "an ongoing, blue-ribbon commission" which consists of attorneys, physicians,
ethicists, religious leaders, and other interested individuals and was convened in 1984. Id. It
was created to make public policy recommendations on questions of medical technological
developments. Id. It has determined that the potential risks of permitting physician-assisted
suicide would outweigh any benefits, thus exposing vulnerable individuals to a tremendous
amount of abuse. Id.
112. Id.
113. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267 (citations omitted).
114. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
115. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
116. Id. (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
117. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 403 (1923); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534-35 (1925)).
118. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485-86 (1965)).
119. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,443 (1972)).
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pregnancy. °20 Particularly relevant to the case at hand, the Supreme Court
has strongly implied that one has the right to refuse "unwanted life-saving
medical treatment."
121
The Supreme Court explained that it must "'exercise the utmost care"'
when examining liberty interests afforded protection by the Due Process
Clause and turned its discussion to Casey and Cruzan.'22 The liberty interest
inferred from Cruzan, to refuse unwanted medical treatment, was grounded
in the nation's historical and legal doctrines in that coerced treatment was
traditionally considered a battery; however, the Supreme Court distinguished
the instant case because states have always declined to permit assisted
suicides.1 23 The Court replied to the plaintiffs' argument, explaining that not
all personal and intimate decisions are sheltered by the Due Process Clause
just by virtue of the fact that most liberties and rights have their basis in
personal autonomy.124 Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the right to
die is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and turned its attention to whether the Washington statute could
nonetheless pass a rational basis test.25
The Supreme Court next explained that the Washington statute must be
rationally related to legitimate government interests and then referred to the
federal district court's decision identifying these interests. 26 The Court
commented that the state has a legitimate interest in preserving life and
preventing suicide, as illustrated by laws protecting human life, and that
permitting physician-assisted suicide would subject especially vulnerable
people to suicidal deaths. 27 The Court suggested that legalization of assisted
suicide would complicate the treatment of depressed, mentally unstable, or
120. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
121. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79
(1990)). However, the Supreme Court held that the State of Missouri could require clear and
convincing evidence of an incompetent patient's wishes regarding the termination of life
support. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280-81 (1990).
122. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268 (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 2270.
124. Id. at 2271 (citation omitted).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2271-72 (citing Compassion in Dying II, 79 F.3d at 816-17). The interests
are as follows: 1) preservation of life; 2) prevention of suicide; 3) avoiding undue influence
from third parties; 4) protecting the family members of terminally ill patients; 5) preserving
the righteousness of the medical profession; and 6) avoiding trends towards euthanasia and
abuse. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2271 n.20.
127. Id. at 2273. The Supreme Court notes that research has suggested that depression
and inadequate pain management highly contribute to requests for physician-assisted suicide.
Id. (citations omitted).
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suicidal individuals. I28 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the state has an
obligation in preserving the integrity of the medical profession and that
permitting physician-assisted suicide is completely contradictory to a
physician's interests in healing their patients. 129 The trust between a patient
and the patient's doctor, the Supreme Court claimed, may be greatly
jeopardized as a result of legalizing physician-assisted suicide. The State
argued that it had interests "in protecting vulnerable groups-including the
poor, the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and
mistakes.' 131  Although the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, the
Supreme Court focused on this interest, stating that terminally ill and
disabled individuals need protection from the abuse associated with the right
to assisted suicide. 32 With respect to the final state interest, the Court noted
that extending a constitutional right for mentally competent, terminally ill
patients to direct physicians to assist in their suicides may prove to be a
"much broader license" which would be an impossibility for the state to
control.133 In addition, the Supreme Court examined various studies that
were conducted in the Netherlands and in New York, and commented that
there is a great potential for abuse and undue influence, and that the
Washington statute banning assisted suicide is, at a minimum, rationally
related to the state's legitimate interests. 34  Thus, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded for
further proceedings.'
35
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS, § 2.211 (1994)).
130. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2273 (quoting Assisted Suicide in the United
States: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 355-56 (1996)). The hearing before the Subcommittee
explained that ."[t]he patient's trust in the doctor's whole-hearted devotion to his best interests
will be hard to sustain."' Id.
131. Id. at 2273.
132. Id. (citing Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592-93); see also Physician-Assisted
Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands. A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady, at 9,
20 (discussing biases towards disabled individuals and negative messages resulting from
assisted suicide). Specifically, the Supreme Court reasoned that it is necessary to prevent
actions based on financial incentives to decrease "end-of-life health-care costs" and to avoid
the danger of adopting policies which may favor the "young and healthy." Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. at 2273.
133. Id. at 2274.
134. Id. at 2274-75.
135. Id. at 2275.
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D. Concurring Opinions
1. Justice O'Connor: State Interests Outweigh Individual Liberty
Justice O'Connor framed the question before the Court as whether "the
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing
so.' 36 Although sympathetic to the idea that death may be painful and
humiliating, Justice O'Connor explained that there is great difficulty in
determining the boundaries of terminal illness and that some decisions to
hasten death may result from mistake or pressure. 37  Justice O'Connor
concluded that Washington's interests in protecting vulnerable individuals
from hastening death "are sufficiently weighty" to warrant the state's
banning of assisted suicide.138 Justice Ginsburg also concurred in the Court's
judgment for the foregoing reasons.139
2. Justice Stevens: Placing Values on Human Life
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens analogized those cases in
which courts have concluded that a state has the authority to allocate lesser
values on certain lives, specifically referring to capital punishment
cases.' 4° According to these decisions, "there is no absolute requirement that
a state treat all human life as having an equal right to
preservation.' ' 41 Although the state was engaged in the valuation of human
life, the state legislatures "had sufficiently narrowed the category of lives"
deserving termination by establishing safeguards to ensure that the
defendants actually "belonged in that limited category."' 42  Although the
Supreme Court has found that the statute is not facially invalid, Justice
Stevens did not restrict the prospect that some operations of the statute may
136. Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Concurring opinions were filed at 117 S.
Ct. 2302 by Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer for both Washington v. Glucksberg and
Vacco v. Quill.
137. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2310 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring). See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment in these three cases by
placing lesser values on the lives of criminals as opposed to non-criminals. Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct. at 2304.
141. Id.
142. Id.
[Vol. 22:821
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 10
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss3/10
1998]
prove to be unconstitutional.' 43 In authorizing punishment of the death
penalty, the State of Washington has determined that "the sanctity of human
life does not require that it always be preserved," and it must recognize that
there will be circumstances where accelerating death will be
justifiable. 44 Justice Stevens next focused on Cruzan, referring to the
freedom which encompasses an individual's "interest in dignity" and
deciding "the character of the memories that will survive long after her
death." r4s Although in Cruzan the Court did not decide the issue at hand, it
acknowledged a liberty interest in deciding the manner in facing an
impending death. 46 Justice Stevens brilliantly explained that the deceased
plaintiffs in the present case "may in fact have had a liberty interest even
stronger than Nancy Cruzan's because, not only were they terminally ill, they
were suffering constant and severe pain."147 Justice Stevens further opined
that eluding unbearable pain and loss of dignity is undoubtedly "'[at] the
heart of [the] liberty . . . to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.'"1
48
Next, the state's interests are discussed and Justice Stevens pointed out
that the prevention of abuse is not applicable, as in the case at hand, to a
mentally competent person who makes a voluntary choice. 49 Confusion will
surely arise as a result of permitting physician-assisted suicide with respect to
the physician's traditional healing role.150 However, Justice Stevens noted
that there is already a significant amount of friction between the established
role and present practice because physicians are already engaged in
withholding life-sustaining medical treatment, and, more relevant to the
present case, administering "terminal sedation."'151 Justice Stevens concluded
that it "is not itself sufficient to outweigh the interest in liberty that may
143. Id. Justice Stevens comments that the Ninth Circuit en banc court did not have to
decide the case based on a particular plaintiff who had violated the statute for assisting a
patient's suicide; thus, the court's finding was not confined to "a particular set of plaintiffs
before it." Id.
144. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2305.
145. Id. at 2306.
146. Id. at 2305.
147. Id. at 2307.
148. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
149. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2308.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2309. Terminal sedation is the "administration of sufficient dosages of pain-
killing medication to terminally ill patients to protect them from excruciating pain" even
though this will bring about a hastened death. Id. at 2310. The argument is that the "intent
and causation" are both identical to the circumstances addressed in the case at bar; that is, both
deal with the advancement of death in efforts to mitigate pain. Id.
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justify the only possible means of preserving a dying patient's dignity and
alleviating her intolerable suffering."'
52
3. Justice Souter: Physician's Role in Ministering Patient
Justice Souter agreed that there was no showing that the statute was
unconstitutional, but he first examined the history of the United States
Supreme Court in deciding due process claims from the Slaughter House
Cases153 through the Lochner'54 era, to Griswold5 5 and Casey.156 Focusing
much on the notion of "'ordered liberty,' comprising a continuum of rights to
be free from 'arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,"' Justice
Souter analyzed the due process claim accordingly. 157 Acknowledging that
there is no precise formula with which one may use in examining liberty
interests, Justice Souter commented that due process involves a balancing
test between the individual's liberty and that of "'organized society."" 58 The
boundaries of substantive due process are derived from "'careful 'respect for
the teachings of histor [and] solid recognition of the basic values that
underlie our society.""' 9 Next, Justice Souter examined the state's interests
and stated that "[i]t is only when the legislation's justifying principle,
critically valued, is so far from being commensurate with the individual
interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied that the statute must give
way. ' ' 6° The fate of determining if an individual has a protected liberty
interest demands "explicit analysis" when that asserted right could be
portrayed as "belonging to different strands of our legal tradition requiring
different degrees of constitutional scrutiny."' 6' For example, the abortion
debate could have been considered according to a woman's freedom of
reproduction, requiring a "substantial burden of justification on the [s]tate,"
152. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2310.
153. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
154. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
155. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
156. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275-80 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment includes the
"right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all
lawful ways; to live and work where he will... [and] to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary, and essential").
157. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2281-82 (citations omitted).
158. Id. at 2282 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)).
159. Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted)).
160. Id. at 2283.
161. Id. at 2285 n.11.
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or according to laws prohibiting feticide except by the mother, requiring
rationality on the state's part.
1 62
In his analysis, Justice Souter explored the legal doctrines which have
"long condemned" suicide and its assistance, noting that the deceased's
survivors were once punished by forfeiture of property to the state. 63 Most
states today have enacted statutes which are similar to the Washington
statute, namely criminalizing assistance in the suicide of another
person.164 Justice Souter brilliantly explained that a physician's assistance is
encompassed in the recognized role not as "a mechanic of the human body
whose services have no bearing on a person's moral choices, but one who
does more than treat symptoms, one who ministers to the patient."165 The
Casey Court determined that "physicians are fit assistants" with respect to the
decision to abort potential life, which includes the abuses associated with
assisted suicide; specifically, there exists the possibility of irresponsibility
and influence from others. 66 Without the assistance of a physician, "the
woman's right would have too often amounted to nothing more than a right
to self-mutilation," and similarly, without the assistance of a physician in the
162. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2285 n.11 (citing Lawrence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf,
Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1057, 1091 (1990)
(suggesting that "reasoned judgment" is necessary in determining which principle suits the
specific claim)).
163. Id. at 2286 (citations omitted). This was abolished because it was unfair to expose
the innocent survivors to such penalties. Id. (citation omitted).
164. Id. at 2287 n.14. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(2) (Michie 1996); ARiz.
REV. STAT. § 13-1103(A)(3) (1996-97); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie 1993);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (Supp. 1996);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-56(a)(2) (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1995); FLA. STAT.
ch. 782.08 (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5(b) (1996); HAW. REv. STAT. § 707-702(1)(b)
(1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 720, § 5/12-31 (1993); IND. CODE §§ 35-42-1-2 to 35-42-1-2.5
(1994 and Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE § 707A.2 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1995); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 (Michie 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12 (West Supp.
1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (West 1983); MICH. COMP. LAws § 752.1027
(1997-98); Minn. STAT. § 609.215 (1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1994); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 565.023.1(2) (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
307 (1995); N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1995);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie 1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1987); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04 (Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 813-15 (1983); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 163.125(1)(b) (1991); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 2505 (West 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 11-60-1 through 11-60-5 (Supp. 1996); S.D. CODFED LAWS § 22-16-37 (Michie
1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 (Supp. 1996); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West
1994); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1994); Wis. STAT. § 940.12 (1993-94); see also P. R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4009 (1984).
165. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2288 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
166. Id.
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suicide of a terminally ill individual, the dying patient's privilege will also be
restricted "to crude methods of causing death, most shocking and painful to
the decedent's survivors. 1 67 As set forth in the plaintiffs' case, for example,
the physicians' patients were compelled to self-kill in crude manners,
sometimes enlisting the assistance of their loved ones to commit
suicide.1 68 Justice Souter further illustrated that physicians are generally
allowed to provide terminal sedation to their patients even though this
"medication is so powerful as to hasten death. 16  Justice Souter concluded
that the State of Washington's interests are "sufficiently serious" to
overpower the assertion that the statute is "arbitrary or purposeless" but also
acknowledged that the legislative process is "preferred" to handle these types
of claims. 170
4. Justice Breyer: Right to Die with Dignity
Justice Breyer joined the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor,
excepting the parts which join the majority, and chose to call this asserted
right the "right to die with dignity.' 171 Justice Breyer explained that it is not
necessary to decide whether there is a recognized fundamental liberty interest
because "the avoidance of severe physical pain (connected with death) would
have to comprise an essential part of any successful claim."'172 New York
and Washington have enacted laws which allow physicians to administer
pain-alleviating medication "despite the risk that those drugs themselves will
kill.' 173 Justice Breyer concludes by stating that the Court may find the need
to "revisit its conclusions in these cases.
167. Id.
168. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1457.
169. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2289. The following states have authorized pain
treatment which hastens death: Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia. Id. at
2289 n.15.
170. Id. at 2290-93.
171. Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
172. Id. Justice Breyer, in expressing Justice O'Connor's ideas, states that the "laws
before us do not force a dying person to undergo that kind of pain." Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at
2311 (emphasis omitted). Justice Breyer further explains that the statutes under review do not
ban physicians from administering such medication which alleviates pain, but, at the same
time, which hastens death. Id.
173. Id. (citation omitted).
174. Id. at 2312 (expressing Justice O'Connor's opinion).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF A RECENT SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE
On July 17, 1997, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the
constitutionality of a Florida statute that prohibits assisted suicide.1 5 Charles
E. Hall and his physician, Cecil McIver, M.D., sought a declaratory judgment
that section 782.08 of the Florida Statutes offended the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as the Privacy Clause
of the Florida Constitution. 76 The plaintiffs brought the action for injunctive
relief against the prosecution of a physician for providing assistance to a
patient in committing suicide.17 7 Mr. Hall was a mentally competent, thirty-
five-year-old who had contracted AIDS from a blood transfusion.1 7 8  The
trial court determined that Dr. McIver found, in his professional judgment,
that "it was medically appropriate and ethical to provide Mr. Hall" with
assistance in committing suicide. 7 9 The trial court further determined that
the statute could not be "constitutionally enforced" against the physicians
and that the prosecutor was enjoined from enforcement of the statute. 180 The
trial court set forth guidelines to ensure that any fatal medication was to be
administered only upon a showing that: 1) Mr. Hall was competent; 2) he
was "'imminently dying;"' and 3) he was "'prepared to die." ' 1  The State
Attorney appealed the decision of the trial court and the Supreme Court of
Florida accepted jurisdiction. 82
The Supreme Court of Florida focused on the recent United States
Supreme Court cases of Vacco v. Quill 183  and Washington v.
Glucksberg.'84 In Vacco, the Supreme Court had distinguished Cruzan by
175. Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997). The statute provides that "[e]very
person deliberately assisting another in the commission of self-murder shall be guilty of
manslaughter." FLA. STAT. ch. 782.08 (1995).
176. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 99.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. The trial court grounded its decision upon the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Privacy Clause of the
Florida Constitution. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 99. The trial court, in accordance with the
Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Glucksberg, did not find a federal liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause. Id.
181. Id. at 100 (quoting McIver v. Krischer, No. CL-96-1504-A.F., 1997 WL 225878,
at *11 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1997), rev'd, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997)).
182. Id.
183. 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2296 (1997) (reversing the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit and upholding New York's ban on assisted suicide).
184. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2262 (reversing the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and upholding Washington's ban on assisted suicide).
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finding that there was a significant distinction between the right to have
assistance in committing suicide and the right to refuse life-sustaining
medical procedures. 85  The Supreme Court of Florida then reasoned in
Krischer that the assistance which Mr. Hall requested was not "treatment in
the traditional sense of that term;" rather, the administration of lethal
medication is equivalent to "an affirmative act designed to cause
death."' 86 Thus, the court explained that its prior decisions concerned only
the rejection of medical procedures, 187 whereas the present case involved
medical interference which will bring about death in a manner other than the
"natural course of events.' 88
The court next focused its attention to whether Mr. Hall had a right to
assisted suicide under the Privacy Clause of the Florida Constitution. 18' It is
evident that the public policy of the State of Florida looks upon assisted
suicide with disfavor.' 9° The court then concentrated on Donaldson v. Van
de Kamp 191 and explained that there are state interests in preserving the lives
of those persons who desire to live, and in protecting members of society
185. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2299.
186. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 102.
187. See In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 828 (Fla. 1993); In re Guardianship of
Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 7-8 (Fla. 1990) (recognizing surrogate asserted right of woman who
was vegetative but not terminally ill to remove nasogastric feeding tube); Public Health Trust
v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 1989) (holding that a mentally competent individual may
refuse blood transfusions for religious reasons); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla.
1980) (recognizing that a patient may withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment).
188. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 102. The American Medical Association described the
distinction by stating:
When a life-sustaining treatment is declined, the patient dies primarily
because of an underlying disease. The illness is simply allowed to take its
natural course. With assisted suicide, however, death is hastened by the
taking of a lethal drug or other agent. Although a physician cannot force a
patient to accept a treatment against the patient's will, even if the treatment is
life-sustaining, it does not follow that a physician ought to provide a lethal
agent to the patient. The inability of physicians to prevent death does not
imply that physicians are free to help cause death.
Id. at 102-03 (quoting AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Report 1-93-8, at 2).
189. Id. at 100. See FLA. STAT. ch. 782.08 (1995) (banning assisted suicide); see also
FLA. STAT. ch. 458.326 (1995) (allowing pain treatment but barring euthanasia and mercy
killing).
190. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 100.
191. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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from abuse. 92 Several Florida organizations which are highly opposed to
assisted suicide filed amicus briefs in regard to this matter. There is the
concern that persons with physical and mental disabilities will be exposed to
undue influence as well as mistake.1 94 The court mentioned the New York
State Task Force on Life and the Law, which had framed the risks associated
with the legalization of assisted suicide.1 95 The court concluded that the State
of Florida's interests "clearlyr outweigh" any benefit which would arise from
permitting assisted suicide. First, because the state has "an unqualified
interest in the preservation of life," the state must prevent the "affirmative
destructive act" of allowing a physician to administer a "'death producing
agent' with the intent of causing certain death." 197 Second, the state has "a
compelling interest in preventing suicide," and must protect those individuals
who may be affected by mistake or pressure to commit suicide. 198 Moreover,
research has demonstrated that there are a great deal of individuals who have
requested assisted suicide, but who would retract their requests if they
received adequate pain management and treatment for depression.199 Finally,
the state has an interest in preserving the integrity of the medical profession
192. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 101 (quoting Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
59, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that "the nature of Donaldson's right of privacy" cannot
be extended to "provide a protective shield for third persons who end his life")).
193. Id. at 102. The following organizations strongly object to assisted suicide: the
Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, Inc.; the American Disabled for Attendant
Programs Today; Not Dead Yet; and the National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent
and Disabled, Inc. Id. The Advocacy Center, in its amicus curiae brief, stated that "[i]f
assisted suicide is permitted in Florida, Floridians will be put on the so-called slippery slope of
determining the relative value of life." Id.
194. Id.
195. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 101. The task force grouped the following risks:
(1) undiagnosed or untreated mental illness; (2) improperly managed physical
symptoms; (3) insufficient attention to the suffering and fears of dying
patients; (4) vulnerability of socially marginalized groups; (5) devaluation of
the lives of the disabled; (6) sense of obligation; (7) patient deference to
physician recommendations; (8) increasing financial incentives to limit care;
(9) arbitrariness of proposed limits; and (10) impossibility of developing
effective regulation.
Id. (citation omitted).
196. Id. at 103.
197. Id. In Perlmutter, the Supreme Court of Florida distinguished the removal of a
respirator from an "'unnatural death by means of a 'death producing agent."" Id. (quoting
Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
198. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 103.
199. Id. (citations omitted).
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and the physician's role as a healer.2 ° The court explained that principal
healthcare associations are unified in objecting to physician-assisted suicide
and posed the question: "Who would have more knowledge of the dangers
of legalizing assisted suicide than those intimately charged with maintaining
the patient's well-being?" 201  Furthermore, the court reasoned that the
"Hippocratic Oath" itself illustrates that physician-assisted suicide is
completely incompatible with a physician's purpose.2°2 The oath states that a
physician "'will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it,
nor... make a suggestion to this effect.' 20 3 The court concluded that it does
"not hold that a carefully crafted statute authorizing assisted suicide would be
unconstitutional," and explained that if the court viewed the Privacy
Amendment of the Florida Constitution to include a right to assisted suicide,
it "would run the risk of arrogating to [themselves] those powers to make
social policy that as a constitutional matter belong only to the legislature."
2 4
V. CONFLICTS WHICH REQUIRE RESOLUTION
A. Liberty Interest According to History and Tradition
1. Distinguishing Casey
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the majority opinion examined the
nation's legal history and tradition and found that because suicide and
assisted suicide have always been looked upon with disfavor, as evidenced
by prohibition laws, there was no liberty interest in the right to die by the
hand of a physician. °5 It is interesting to note that many states outlawed
abortion until the decision of Roe v. Wade, but yet a liberty interest was
found with respect to a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy.
206
200. Id.
201. Id. at 104. These organizations include: the American Medical Association, the
Florida Medical Association, the Florida Society of Internal Medicine, the Florida Society of
Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgeons, the Florida Osteopathic Medical Association, the
Florida Hospices, Inc., and the Florida Nurses Association. Id.
202. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 104.
203. Id. (citation omitted).
204. Id. (citation omitted).
205. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2263 (citation omitted).
206. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The following states had abortion laws
which were effective in 1868 and remained effective as of August 1970: Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 176-77 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The decision of a woman to have an abortion affects not only the life of
the mother but also the life of the fetus.2 7 In that situation, there is more
than one interest at stake and yet the Supreme Court has still declined to
protect the liberty interest of the fetus which appears to be stronger than a
mother's right to seek an abortion. °8 In the case of assisted suicide there is
one life involved which can "voice his or her wishes,"2w as opposed to
abortion where there is the unspoken voice of potential life.210 It seems
unreasonable and illogical to conclude that the right to determine one's own
fate is not afforded that same protection. These terminally ill individuals are
making decisions which affect their own lives and there is the absence of
other interests; that is, the fetus or potential life.21 1 As the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington pointed out in
Compassion in Dying, there is surely a stronger argument with respect to the
right to die issue. 1
Furthermore, the Casey Court found that "physicians are fit assistants"
concerning the decision to abort potential life. It is interesting to note that
the abuses associated with assisted suicide are similar to those associated
with abortion; that is, irresponsibility and undue influence from
others. 214 The Roe Court found that the liberty interest in terminating a
woman's pregnancy would have resulted in "self-mutilation" if a woman
were not permitted to enlist the assistance of a physician. 21 5 Following this
reasoning, terminally ill patients who are denied the assistance of a physician
will surely resort to other "crude methods" of dying, as exemplified in the
plaintiffs' case where a physician's terminally ill patient, who was denied
assistance, requested a loved one to help him in jumping from a bridge.216 It
is enough that family members have to watch their loved ones both suffer
and lose all sense of dignity; however, it is even more appalling that these
family members are now forced into awkward and difficult situations in
providing assistance.
To further illustrate this point, it is disturbing to note that a Florida
company is offering something called an "Exit Bag" kit to assist in
207. Compassion, 850 F. Supp at 1460.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Compassion, 850 F. Supp at 1460.
213. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2288 (citation omitted).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Brief for Respondent at 5, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
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committing suicide.1 7 For thirty dollars, terminally ill individuals can
purchase a durable plastic bag with a soft elastic neckband and Velcro
clasps.218 For an additional ten dollars, these individuals can purchase a book
which describes exactly how to commit suicide. 219 Even for right to die
organizations such as Washington's Compassion in Dying, this concept is
horrifying. Denying terminally ill patients the right to assisted suicide forces
these individuals to consider hideous measures such as the "Exit Bag. 220
There comes a time when a physician has exhausted all possibilities to
cure his patient. The doctor's role should then transform into that of making
the patient more comfortable. Physicians are more qualified and better able
to comfortably treat their patients during these excruciatingly painful periods
of terminal disease. If treatment should include complying with a mentally
competent person's desire to die, then that individual should have the right to
control his own life.
2. Distinguishing Cruzan
In Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court recognized a liberty interest
to refuse unwanted medical treatment protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 22' In that case, the legal
history and tradition was grounded in the fact that coerced medical treatment
was always considered a battery.222 Likewise, in Compassion in Dying, the
majority in the Ninth Circuit explained that there has never existed a right to
have another "enslave you, mutilate you, or kill you."223 What physicians
would actually do is prevent harm by respecting the wishes of their patients
when both the physician and patient have faced the reality that there is
absolutely no chance for recovery. Physicians are looking out for their
patients' best interests in relieving their agonizing pain and loss of
dignity. As Justice Souter eloquently explained in Glucksberg, a physician is
not simply "a mechanic of the human body," but he is "one who ministers to
the patient. 224 The physician provides comfort and support for the patient
even when all hope is lost with respect to a chance for recovery. The
"Hippocratic Oath," which states that a physician will not administer a
217. Diane C. Lade, Society Defies Courts With Offer of Exit Bag, SUN-SENTINEL, July
19, 1997, at IA.
218. Id. at 12A.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990).
222. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2770.
223. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594.
224. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2288 (citations omitted).
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deadly drug,= was written on the basis of outdated medicine and not on the
medical technological advancements which have occurred to
date.Y 6 Consequently, patients are able to live longer than they would have
absent this technology. 7 Thus, to argue that there is a distinction between
the refusal of life-sustaining measures which allow the natural progression of
death and the affirmative act of intending to cause death by lethal medication
is groundless in common sense.' Absent these technological
breakthroughs, patients would be able to let their diseases take a natural
course. However, due to medications which prolong life, terminally ill
patients are living longer, thereby suffering miserably. Although there has
been a great deal of discussion concerning this distinction, both acts produce
the same result.229 In both cases, medical personnel are intending to bring
about death. In the case of the withdrawal of medical treatment, the
physician is certain that artificial means are the only sustenance for their
patient and that if these medical procedures are terminated, the patient will
surely die. In the case of physician-assisted suicide, doctors are carrying out
their patients' wishes by providing medication which will bring about their
death. There is no doubt about the intended result. In both cases, the
physician is carrying out the directive of the patient and causing that patient's
death.
Another troubling aspect of the right to die issue is that terminal
sedation is already permitted in New York and Washington;230 that is,
physicians are empowered to provide dosages of medication which alleviate
pain, but at the same time cause the patients' death to occur
prematurely.23I Most of the time, the levels of painkilling medication which
will mitigate the dying patient's pain will result in unconsciousness and
ultimately, a shortened death.z 2 It is ludicrous that physicians are able to
provide these medications while fully aware of the consequences of a
hastened death, yet the Supreme Court declines to recognize a right to avoid
the agonizing and humiliating period which patients must endure before their
impending death arrives.
225. MELVIN KONNER, M.D., BECOMING A DOCTOR: A JOURNEY OF INITIATION IN
MEDICAL SCHOOL viii (1988).
226. Id.
227. Kathy L. Cerminara, In the U.S. Supreme Court: Can States Prosecute Physicians
for Assisting Their Competent, Terminally Ill Patients in Committing Suicide?, WEsT's LEGAL
NEws, January 3, 1997, at *4.
228. Brief for Petitioner at 12, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
229. Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97, 102-03 (Fla. 1997).
230. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
231. Id.
232. Id.
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B. State Interests are Insufficient to Outweigh Individual Liberty
Several state interests have been found to outweigh any individual
notion of liberty with respect to physician-assisted suicide.233 The first
argument which asserts that the state has an unqualified interest in preserving
life, is carelessly flawed.234 As Justice Stevens explained in his concurring
opinion in Glucksberg, the state already has the power to place different
values on human lives in the context of criminals facing the death
penalty.235 The state cannot claim that there is an "absolute requirement that
a State treat all human life as having an equal right to preservation" because
it has already devalued the lives of a certain group of persons by allowing the
death penalty.236 Furthermore, just as there are limitations and safeguards
imposed in capital punishment cases, there should be no concern for
assigning lesser values on terminally ill persons who wish to end their own
lives. 37 By authorizing capital punishment, the State of Washington has in
essence already conceded that there will be times when the state will assign
lesser values on human life.238 It is utterly absurd to believe that a state has
an absolute obligation to treat all life on an equal playing field.
Second, preserving both the integrity of the medical profession and the
physician's traditional role as a healer were found to be significant state
interests.239 The "Hippocratic Oath" states that the physician "will prescribe
regimen for the good of [his] patients according to [his] ability and [his]
judgment and never do harm to anyone. To please no one will [he] prescribe
a deadly drug, nor give advice which may cause his death." 240 Although it
may appear that this solves the dilemma of whether a physician would be
contradicting his oath, it is not so simple. If one were to read on, he or she
would find that the "Hippocratic Oath" further states that "[n]or will [he]
give a woman a pessary to procure abortion." 241  It seems that the
"Hippocratic Oath" is inapplicable to the current law in that physicians may
perform abortions and not face criminal liability. Furthermore, the
"Hippocratic Oath" specifically states that a physician will use his judgment
in determining the best treatment for his patient and that the physician "will
233. Id. at 2272-74.
234. Id. at 2272-73.
235. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 2305.
239. Id. at 2273.
240. KONNER, supra note 225, at viii.
241. Id.
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enter [houses] only for the good of [his] patients."242 It hardly benefits a
mentally competent incurable person who is experiencing excruciating pain,
loss of dignity, and humiliation, to deny them the right to assisted
suicide. To deny this right to dying persons is to strip them of their
autonomy and thwart their ability to make decisions which affect "intimate
and personal" matters.243
Third, to address the concern that vulnerable persons, including the
elderly, handicapped, and economically disadvantaged, will be subject to
mistake, abuse, or pressure, the legislature must carefully formulate a statute
which provides limitations and safeguards for assistance with suicide in the
case of mentally competent, terminally ill individuals.244 Justice Souter's
concurring opinion in Glucksberg, properly suggests that the legislature
should deal with these situations because it is not a matter for the judiciary.245
VI. CONCLUSION
Nothing could be more devastating than to endure the suffering and
humiliation which accompanies a terminal illness. The ultimate fate of these
patients' lives are put in hands other than their own and they are left without
recourse.
The solution is for state legislatures to formulate detailed statutes which
outline the procedures a terminally ill patient must undergo in order to have
assistance from a physician in committing suicide.246 State legislatures
should use the following seven criteria as a guideline in formulating a statute:
1) the decision must be a voluntary one that the patient
repeatedly initiates;
2) the patient must be competent and capacitated;
3) the patient must be suffering from an incurable disease;
4) the physician must know that the patient is not suffering
from inadequate comfort care;
5) there must be a meaningful relationship between the
doctor and the patient;
242. Id.
243. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
244. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1465.
245. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2293.
246. Id.
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6) second opinions are necessary prior to the assistance in
suicide; and
7) clear documentation that the above criteria have been
satisfied is both prudent and ethically mandatory.247
Carefully constructed statutes, which incorporate the above procedures
and further require clear and convincing evidence that terminally ill
individuals have satisfied these requirements, are the only answer. State
legislatures must devise safeguards to ensure that abuse is prevented and that
only those individuals who satisfy the prerequisites receive assistance in
ending their pain and suffering. The State has a significant interest in
protecting vulnerable individuals, and these cautiously formulated statutes
will provide the necessary protection.
Nicole Testa
247. BRENDAN MINOGUE, BIOETHICS: A COMMrITEE APPROACH 81 (1996) (citation
omitted); see also Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1458 (explaining the organization Compassion
in Dying's stringent eligibility requirements).
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